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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHURCH




When a court-appointed receiver attempted to take control of
the Worldwide Church of God headquarters on January 3, 1979, the
confrontation created headline news. Church leaders and attorneys
across the country awaited the precedential resolution of a classic
church legal battle. Few noticed that the first and second causes of
action in the complaint alleged failure to account to the members of
the corporation, failure to hold regular meetings of the members of
the corporation, and failure to allow the members to vote on the
governance of the corporation or to elect the directors as required
by law.' During the hearing on the order to show cause, the court
observed,
with reference to the conduct of the affairs of the church,
the administration of its assets and the expenditures over
the last several years, and up to the present time-it
seems to be conceded that in spite of the fact that the ar-
ticles are filed in this corporation under the nonprofit
clause of the State of California, and in spite of the fact
that there are specific provisions in the articles and
bylaws which place control in the board of directors, it
seems, nevertheless, to be conceded that for many years
this was essentially a one-man operation
It is an open question whether conduct of the corporate affairs
in harmony with relevant bylaws and statutes would have avoided
the sensational controversy over the church's financial practices. No
one can say, but the incentive for a court challenge to management
practices would certainly have been minimized.
Another church legal controversy that involves organizational
structure is whether church-related schools are subject to unemploy-
* Vice President and General Counsel to Church State Council of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church.
1. State v. Worldwide Church of God, Inc., No. C267607 (L.A. Super. Ct., fil-
ed, Jan. 2, 1979).
2. Reporter's Transcript at 388.
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ment insurance laws. Prior to January 1, 1978, the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act permitted states to exempt services provided in
the employ of a church and also services provided in the employ of a
school.' In 1976, Congress amended the Act eliminating the exemp-
tion for employees of a school.' Although several courts have upheld
the ruling of the United States Secretary of Labor that removing
the education exemption had effectively eliminated the exemption
for all church-related schools,5 the United States Supreme Court has
recently ruled that schools that are a part of a church organization
remain exempt.' The Court recognized that many of the church
schools have no separate legal existence and their employees are
hired, controlled, disciplined, and fired by church representatives;
school buildings are owned by the church; and their employees are
paid from church accounts.7
"Neither school has a separate legal existence. Thus, the em-
ployees working within these schools plainly are 'in the employ ...
of a church or convention or association of churches.' "' In this con-
troversy, distinctions involving organizational structure have been
prominent thoughout the opinions of the courts9 as well as the legis-
3. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3306(c)(8), 3309(b) (1970)
(amended 1976).
4. Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-566, § 115(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2671 (1976).
5. E.g., Ascension Lutheran Church v. Employment Security Bd., 501 F.
Supp. 843 (W.D.N.C. 1980); Independent Baptist Church v. Tennessee, 468 F. Supp. 71
(E.D. Tenn. 1978).
6. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church and Northwestern Lutheran
Academy v. South Dakota, __ U.S. ., 49 U.S.L.W. 4575 (1981).
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that all church-related schools
are now included under the Act and did not analyze the significance of corporate struc-
ture, the court quoted legislative history indicating that Congress has considered
organizational structure to be significant, at least with regard to institutions of higher
education:
[S]ervices of the janitor of a church would be excluded but services of a
janitor for a separately incorporated college, although it may be church
related, would be covered. . . . On the otherhand, a church related
(separately incorporated) charitable organization (such as, for example, an
orphanage or a home for the aged) would not be considered under this
paragraph to be operated primarily for religious purposes.
In the Matter of Northwestern Lutheran Academy, - S.D. -, 290 N.W.2d 845,
848 (1980) quoting H.R. Rep. No. 612, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1969).
7. 49 U.S.L.W. at 4577.
8. Id. at 4578 (footnote omitted).
9. Most cases support the exemption of church-related schools. E.g.,
Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980); Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.
Bowling, 89 Ill. App. 3d 100, 411 N.E.2d 526 (1980); Roman Catholic Church of the
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lative history. The decision of the Court rested on statutory inter-
pretation and the Court observed:
Our holding today concerns only schools that have no
legal identity separate from a church. To establish exemp-
tion from FUTA, a separately incorporated church school
(or other organization) must satisfy the requirements of §
3309(b)(1)(B): (1) that the organization 'is operated primari-
ly for religious purposes', and (2) that it is 'operated,
supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a
church or convention or association of churches."
Professor Charles Whelan has suggested that Internal Revenue
Service regulations ought to distinguish among religious organiza-
tions on the basis of function rather than form." He would treat all
church-related institutions the same except for those institutions
that serve the general public and derive a substantial percentage of
their current income from government. He would make no distinc-
tion on the basis that the organization was separately incorporated. 2
However, Whelan points out that terms such as "church," "religious
organization," "integrated auxiliaries," and "religious order" each
have a significantly different tax treatment under various sections
of the Internal Revenue Code and regulations. The regulations
"carry the threat that mere separate incorporation by a church or
one of its component parts will result in a refusal by Treasury and
the Internal Revenue Service to treat that part as entitled to the
tax status of a 'church.' "" The Court, recognizing this difficulty,
noted, "we disavow any intimations in this case defining or limiting
what constitutes a church under FUTA or under any other provision
of the Internal Revenue Code."'"
Analyzing, designing, and meticulously examining organiza-
tional structure to obtain optimum advantage in dealing with gov-
Diocese of New Orleans v. State, 387 So. 2d 1248 (La. App. 1980); Sant Bani Ashram,
Inc. v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security, 121 N.H. 74, 426 A.2d 34 (1981);
Begley v. Employment Security Comm'n, 50 N.C. App. 432, 274 S.E.2d 370 (1981);
Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Security Bureau, 294 N.W.2d
767 (N.D. 1980); Employment Div. v. Archdiocese of Portland, 42 Or. App. 421, 600
P.2d 926 (1979); Christian School Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 423 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1980).
10. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4578.
11. Whelan, "Church" in Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 899 (1977) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 898-99.
13. Id. at 899.
14. St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church, 49 U.S.L.W. at 4578, n.15.
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ernment and the public bring to mind the world of complex business
corporations, but now the organizational alternatives available to
religious organizations have increased and the consequences of or-
ganizational structure have multiplied. The considerations are dif-
ferent for church executives and attorneys than for the business
world, but the significance of organizational structure can no longer
be ignored. Many of the lawsuits involving churches are influenced
by organizational structure and practice. 15 It has therefore become
necessary to examine the significance of organizational structure in
relation to members, to the government, and to the public; in order
to achieve organizational purposes and to implement denominational
philosophy.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The historical development of religious organizations illu-
minates current ramifications of the differing structures."6 In Eng-
land a corporation could exist only with the express approval of the
state and could not hold property on its own behalf."7 Corporations
were established by obtaining special charters from the king. These
concepts were carried to the American Colonies. 8 Incorporation by
special charter was widespread in New England and continues today
in some states. 9
Some New England colonies officially recognized and estab-
lished a particular church. An organizational pattern developed that
15. E.g., In the Matter of Northwestern Lutheran Academy, -S.D.__,
290 N.W.2d 845 (1980); State v. Worldwide Church of God. Inc., No. C267607 (L.A.
Super. Ct., filed, Jan. 2, 1979).
16. For a comprehensive survey of the history of religious corporations and
the types of religious corporations laws currently in existence, see Kauper and Ellis,
Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1499 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Kauper and Ellis].
17. Id. at 1504-05.
18. Id. at 1505. An interesting example of the partiality that may arise under
this method of creating corporations is demonstrated in Application for Charter of the
Conversion Center, Inc., 388 Pa. 239, 1304 A.2d 107 (1957). When an application was
presented to the superior court to obtain a charter for a corporation which included in
its purposes to "place particular emphasis on evangelization and conversion of
adherents to the Roman Catholic faith," the court denied the application because
granting it "would in effect place the blanket of approval of this court on such
activity." Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found the organization entitled to
a charter and reversed the lower court, its decision was accompanied by a vigorous
dissent to the effect that government authorization of proselytizing would violate
separation of church and state.
19. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 41 et seq. (1974); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 3(b) (West 1970).
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has been referred to as a territorial parish." The church organiza-
tion was similar to a municipal organization. Membership came with
residence within the boundaries of the parish and subjected one to
"all the consequences, agreeable and disagreeable, which residence
in a town or county implied."21 In some cases the minister exercised
powers under a common law concept of corporation sole.' As reli-
gious pluralism developed and the nation moved toward a separation
of church and state four types of statutory corporations gradually
developed.23
A. Special Corporate Charters
In some states the practice of granting special corporate
charters upon application was formalized in a statutory scheme 4 and
this system of incorporation still exists in some states. Some stat-
utes even provide specifically for the corporate affairs of each par-
ticular denomination. 5 The constitutionality of this type of incor-
20. See Kauper and Ellis, supra note 16, at 1505.
21. Id. at 1506, quoting C. ZOLLMAN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 106 (1933).
22. At a very early period the religious establishment of England seems to
have been adopted in the Colony of Virginia; and, of course, the common
law upon that subject, so far as it was applicable to the circumstances of
that colony. The local division into parishes for ecclesiastical purposes can
be very early traced; and the subsequent laws enacted for religious pur-
poses evidently presupposed the existence of the Episcopal Church with
its general rights and authorities growing out of the common law ...
among other things, the church was capable of receiving endowments of
land, and ... the minister of the parish was, during his encumbancy, seiz-
ed of the free hold of its inheritable property, as emphatically person ec-
clesiae, and capable, as a sole corporation, of transmitting that inheri-
tance to his successors.
Terett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 46 (1815).
Some courts have also recognized the existence of a Roman Catholic common
law corporation sole. See Municipality of Ponce v. Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,
210 U.S. 296, 318 (1908); Reid v. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 887, 112 S. 846, 860 (1927); Blanc v.
Alsbury, 63 Tex. 489 (1885).
23. See text accompanying notes 24-41 infra.
24. E.g., N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 180 (Consol. 1952), as applied in Application
of New York Soul Clinic, 208 Misc. 612, 144 N.Y. Supp. 2d 543 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 81 (Purdon 1959), as applied in Application for Charter of the Conversion
Center, Inc., 388 Pa. 239, 130 A.2d 107 (1957).
25. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:12-4 (West 1976), as applied in Protestant
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of New Jersey v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19
(1980), where the court indicates that, although the state has a general statute for the
incorporation of religious societies and congregations, the Episcopal parish in that case
was incorporated under "An Act to incorporate religious societies, worshipping accord-
ing to the customs and usages of the Protestant Episcopal Church." Id. at -, 417
A.2d at 20 n.l.
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poration statute is open to question and the structure of churches
under these statutes usually cannot be changed without amending
the statute.
2 6
We have long passed the time when the state has any right to
show favoritism in granting a privilege of this nature and the temp-
tation to exercise prior restraint and censorship is inherent in the
special charter system. The modern procedure of filing articles of in-
corporation rather than applying for a charter is a significant im-
provement.
B. Trustee Corporations
Under the trustee corporate form, trustees hold the assets of
the corporation with an obligation to carry out the corporate pur-
poses. The use of trustees to hold property developed as a widely
used device at common law because an unincorporated association
was not a legal entity and could not hold property in its own name.17
By incorporating the trustees who already held title to the property,
the legislatures of some states provided perpetual succession with-
out any need to transfer property to some different entity and with-
out changing the existing relationship. This method of incorporation
was adopted in many eastern states and is widely used today."
Under early common law a trust could not be enforced without
specific identifiable beneficiaries. In England the concept of a
charitable trust developed in which the trustee held assets for a par-
ticular use or purpose rather than for specific individuals. This
charitable trust concept appears to have been the foundation for
what has come to be called Lord Eldon's Rule. Lord Eldon extended
the charitable trust concept by holding that assets contributed to a
church were impressed with an implied trust in favor of the fun-
damental doctrines and usages of the church at the time the contri-
butions were madeY Lord Eldon's Rule or the Implied Trust-
Departure from Doctrine Rule was followed by many courts in
America. 30
26. James Madison vetoed such an act incorporating an Episcopal church in
the District of Columbia in 1810. For the full text of Madison's veto message, see
Kauper and Ellis, supra note 16, at 1558 n.333.
27. See Hunt v. Adams, __ Fla. -, 149 So. 24 (1933). See also Kauper and
Ellis, supra note 16, at 1511.
28. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.40.110 (1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-255
(West 1960).
29. Attorney General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135 (1817); Craig
Dallie v. Aikman, 3 Eng. Rep. 601 (1813).
30. One judge observed that especially in the mid Atlantic and southern
states the courts
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 [1981], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss1/4
1981] CHURCH ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 151
The implied trust concept placed the courts in the position of
passing judgment on the meaning and significance of church doc-
trine. The judge decides which beliefs are important, which are or-
thodox, and how they are to be implemented in church affairs. This
obviously is not a role consistent with church-state separation. On
the other hand, without court intervention, the trustee corporate
form placed the trustees in a position where they could dominate
church affairs, whether or not church polity recognized them as the
appropriate organizational leaders, because they had control of the
church assets. Whenever any dispute arose, the disagreement often
led to division when the majority trustees appropriated the assets
for the use of whichever faction they happened to favor. Unless the
particular church happens to have beliefs that harmonize with the
organizational structure the state has imposed, church polity is ig-
nored and church affairs are disrupted or conducted in ways not
necessarily consistent with church values and objectives.
Toward the middle of the 1800's a renewed zeal for democratic
processes inspired yet a third state imposed distortion of church
polity. In 1854, the New York Court of Appeals, apparently dissatis-
fied with the implied trust concept and with trustee dominance of
religious corporations, reinterpreted its religious incorporations act
and declared that "it was the intention of the legislature to place
the control of the temporal affairs of these societies in the hands of
the majority of the corporators."3 ' A few years later, the member-
ship majority of a congregation was allowed to leave the Congrega-
tional Church and keep the property when they reaffiliated as a
Presbyterian church."2
Then, in 1872, the Supreme Court rejected the implied trust
concept and the departure-from-doctrine corollary. " In the search to
identify an implied purpose, the courts previously recognized two
types of church polity based on different sources of authority. The
congregational church, usually independent of any authority outside
the local congregation, is directed ultimately by majority vote while
seemed to adopt or ignore Lord Eldon's Rule as the facts of the particular
dispute dictated. Equity ascendant; constitutional principles be damned.
Sometimes the 'established church' was favored by the court's decision; at
other times, the off-shoot faction of the church prevailed. No logical
thread of consistency developed to govern the outcome of these disputes
or to portend the future direction of the law.
Brady v. Reiner, 157 W.Va. 10, 198 S.E.2d 812, 826 (1973).
31. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243, 264 (1854).
32. Petty v. Tooker, 21 N.Y. 267 (1860).
33. 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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the hierarchial church vests authority in various leaders of the
church organizational structure. The Court ruled that internal dis-
putes by congregational or independent churches must be resolved
by applying their internal rules of government and the principles
that ordinarily govern voluntary associations.34 Congregations be-
longing to a hierarchical church were described as "a subordinate
member of some general church organization in which there are su-
perior ecclesiastic tribunals."35 The Court held that the decisions of
the ecclesiastical tribunals must be accepted as final and binding.36
C. Membership Corporations
As the modern business corporation governed by shareholders
has developed, statutes for nonprofit organizations frequently have
followed that pattern and it is the most widely established structure
for nonprofit corporations today. 7 The members of the congregation
form the membership of the corporation and become voting partici-
pants in corporate affairs. As usually adopted, this form probably
lends itself most readily to the polity of independent or congrega-
tional churches, while the trustee and special charter forms better
accommodate heirarchical churches.
D. Corporations Sole
A corporation sole is a corporation formed by one person who
is the head of a religious body and is empowered to carry on the cor-
porate affairs of the organization." This form has origins in the
34. Id. at 725.
35. Id. at 722.
36. The following sources trace the course of the Court's decisions on this
subject. First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church, 430
F. Supp. 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259,
153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1979); State ex rel. Marrow v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74, 364 N.E.2d
1156 (1977); Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d 19 (1980); Brady v.
Reiner, 157 W. Va. 10, 198 S.E.2d 812 (1973); Adams and Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf:
Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 PA. L. REV.
1291 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Adams and Hanlon]; Kauper, Church Autonomy and
the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 347
[hereinafter cited as Church Autonomy]; Note, Church Property Dispute Resolution:
An Expanded Role for Courts After Jones v. Wolf? 68 GEo L.J. 1141 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Church Property Dispute]; Note, Jones v. Wolf: Neutral Principle
Standards of Review for Intrachurch Disputes, 13 Loy. OF L.A. L. REV. 109 (1979).
37. Kauper and Ellis, supra note 16, at 1539.
38. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 10000 et seq. (West 1977).
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Church of England39 and the Roman Catholic Church." Although
widely used today, there was a time when "the notion of a one-man
corporation with all of its concomitant powers, was not generally ac-
ceptable to civil authorities, and the church was generally unsuc-
cessful in its efforts to have the corporation sole adopted."'"
II. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
A number of states have followed the model Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Code which is based on a membership corporation concept.42
This may work well for those congregational churches whose policy
happens to conform, but it does not adequately recognize the need
for a system of corporate law that is adaptable to the widely differ-
ing organizational structures of various denominations.
From the perspective of churches, a second deficiency is the
failure of the model act to distinguish between religious and other
nonprofit corporations. Constitutional and public policy considera-
tions relevant to religious corporations are completely different than
those concerning other corporations. Similarly, governmental objec-
tives in regulation of religious corporations are different than those
that apply to other nonprofit corporations.
California, in a recent revision of its Nonprofit Corporations
Code, recognized the tremendous diversity of nonprofit organiza-
tions and provided for three primary types of nonprofit corpora-
tions: mutual benefit, public benefit, and religious.43 In contrast to
the provisions regarding mutual benefit corporations, where the leg-
islature incorporated extensive membership rights,4 and to the pro-
visions regarding public benefit corporations, where there is a
strong public policy favoring democratic procedures,45 the religious
corporation provisions contemplate the broadest latitude in organ-
ization and conduct of corporate affairs while providing adequate
39. Kauper and Ellis, supra note 16, at 1505.
40. Id. at 1523.
41. Id. at 1523-24.
42. E.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 29-1001 to 29-10991 (West 1968 & Supp.
1978-79); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32 § 163a et seq. (1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1901 to
21-19,109 (1977).
43. In addition, the code retains provision for corporations sole. CAL. CORP.
CODE §§ 10000-15 (West 1977).
44. Id. §§ 7310-50 (West Supp. 1981).
45. Id. §§ 5510-27 (West Supp. 1981).
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guidelines for those instances where the organization has not clearly
defined its own polity in its articles or bylaws.
1
III. LITIGATION
Courts generally have expressed reluctance to become involved
in disputes over church membership. 7 However, the courts have
been willing to determine whether actions concerning membership
have been taken in a fair, impartial way in accord with the organiza-
tion's own rules of procedure.48 Similarly, courts have been willing to
supervise an election of a pastor or a trustee where it appears that
the church itself is having difficulty conducting an impartial elec-
tion. 9
The manner of conducting church business has been central to
many cases. Some of those cases have arisen simply because of care-
lessness, ignorance, or malice." The message in these cases is that
church officers, pastors, and denominational leaders may well find
themselves on the losing side in litigation if they fail to recognize
basic organizational and procedural requirements.
In other cases, litigation has occurred or its outcome has been
determined by the failure of churches to develop a structure consis-
tent with their concept of church organization. In Samoan Congrega-
tional Christian Church v. Samoan Congregational Church of Ocean-
side"' a dispute arose between a local congregation and its parent
denominational body.52 When the local church ousted its minister
and installed another in his place, the parent body, an unincor-
46. Id. §§ 9110-9610 (West Supp. 1981).
47. But see Randolph v. First Baptist Church of Lockland, 68 Ohio Law Abs.
100, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954).
48. See Konkel v. Metropolitan Baptist Church, 117 Ariz. 271, 572 P.2d 99
(1977); Second Baptist Church of Reno v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church, 86 Nev. 164, 466
P.2d 212 (1970); Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1979).
49. Providence Baptist Church v. Superior Ct., 40 Cal. 2d 55, 251 P.2d 10
(1952); Burnett v. Banks, 130 Cal. App. 2d 631, 279 P.2d 579 (1955); Second Baptist
Church of Reno v. Mt. Zion Baptist Church, 86 Nev. 164, 466 P.2d 212 (1970).
50. E.g., Mt. Zion Baptist Church v. Second Baptist Church of Reno, 83 Nev.
367, 432 P.2d 328 (1967). Vote to merge was invalid because meeting was called
without notice required by the bylaws.
51. 66 Cal. App. 3d 69, 135 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1977).
52. By far the most frequent type of litigation churches have become involved
in that is influenced by corporate structure is the internal dispute; either congrega-
tional split or conflict between congregation and denominational hierarchy. It is
estimated that there are ten to twenty-five such cases each year. See Adams and
Hanlon, supra note 34, at 1291 n.1; Church Property Dispute, supra note 34, at 1140
n.1.
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porated association of churches, brought an action to impress a trust
on all the assets of the local church. The court refused to consider
where the ecclesiastical power rested within the church because the
court found no evidence of intent to create an express or implied
trust. Further, the articles of incorporation and bylaws of the local
congregation placed the control of the corporation in the board of di-
rectors and provided that the government of the church was vested
in its members. In those circumstances the court indicated "the
assets of the religious non-profit corporation are deemed to be im-
pressed with a charitable trust deriving from the express decla-
ration of corporate purpose.""3 Although the case does not reveal
whether the language of those corporate documents reflected a di$-
agreement between the congregation and its parent body over the
appropriate distribution of governing power within the church or-
ganization or resulted from the unfortunate use of pattern language
from a lawyer's form book, it certainly demonstrates the danger of
using standardized pattern language in organizational documents for
a church. A careful review must be made to insure that the docu-
ments faithfully reflect the intended structure and allocation of au-
thority.'
The courts applying Lord Eldon's Rule 5 were willing to protect
organizational purpose even to the point of impressing church assets
with an implied trust for the purposes for which the organization ex-
isted at the time the assets were given. Although courts will not
now seek an implied trust," it is clear that they will enforce an ex-
press trust. Therefore, it is important to remember that "the assets
of the religious nonprofit corporation are deemed to be impressed
with a charitable trust deriving from the express declaration of cor-
porate purpose." 7
The corporate purpose, as set forth in the articles of incorpora-
tion, needs the most careful thought and drafting. A careful value
judgment is required. Often incorporators are anxious to articulate a
53. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
54. Under the "living relationship test" some courts have looked at the con-
duct of the parties. See, e.g., State Ex Rel. Morrow v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74, 364
N.E.2d 1156 (1977). The court expressly refused to look at the conduct of the parties in
Samoan Church and the modern emphasis on "neutral principles" encourages this nar-
rower review.
55. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
56. But see Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 254 S.E.2d 330 (1970).
57. Samoan Congregational Church, 66 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
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narrow specific corporate purpose to insure "preservation of the
faith." However, foresight is rarely adequate to anticipate all the
possible changes in purpose and such restrictions often are more
hindrance than help.
One case where corporate purpose became decisive was Queen
of Angels Hospital v. Younger.58 Apparently because of changing cir-
cumstances, the directors of a church-operated nonprofit hospital
decided to lease the hospital facility and to use the proceeds from
the lease to operate medical clinics. 9 They filed an action for
declaratory relief seeking court approval of the plan. After review-
ing the articles of incorporation and finding that the express pri-
mary purpose was operation of a hospital, the court ruled that
"whatever else Queen of Angels Hospital Corporation may do under
its articles of incorporation, it was intended to and did operate a
hospital and cannot, consistent with the trust imposed upon it, aban-
don the operation of the hospital business in favor of clinics.""°
In a similar situation, the six remaining members of a Baptist
church voted to dissolve the corporation and to distribute the assets
to three Baptist churches, a servicemen's center, and a theological
seminary. However, the articles of incorporation stated that the in-
corporators were "desirous of forming and conducting in Richmond,
Contra Costa County, a Baptist Church."61 In dissolution proceedings
the court ruled that the assets were "impressed with a charitable
trust by virtue of the express declaration of the corporation's pur-
poses," 2 applied the doctrine of cy pres, and directed that the assets
be divided between the two nearest Baptist churches. From the
standpoint of applying neutral principles of law, the court's decision
may be correct. However, it is difficult to see how this decision, im-
posing the will of the state on the church, serves any constructive
purpose for either the state or the church, unless it was actually the
intent of the church to restrict the use of its assets. The most effec-
tive drafting remedy is not to use language of trust that will invite
unwanted court participation in church affairs.
The new California Nonprofit Corporation Code avoids any risk
that a statement of corporate purpose will be interpreted as creat-
ing a trust that was not intended. Section 9130 of the California Cor-
58. 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1977).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 368, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
61. Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. v. Younger, 48 Cal. App.
3d 850, 854, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899, 901 (1975).
62. Id. at 857, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 903, quoting Pacific Home v. City of Los
Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852, 264 P.2d 539, 543 (1953).
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poration Code provides that the statement of purpose in the articles
of incorporation will be "this corporation is a religious corporation
and is not organized for the private gain of any person. It is organiz-
ed under the Nonprofit Religious Corporation Law (primarily or ex-
clusively [insert one or both]) for religious purposes." 3 The code sec-
tion does permit a further description of the corporation's purposes
but the draftsman should remember that a more specific statement
of purpose may result in a narrower charitable trust being imposed
on the use of the organization's assets.
Most Supreme Court decisions on the subject of corporate pur-
pose have been in the context of church property disputes. In Wat-
son v. Jones,"4 the Court announced that it would accept the decision
of the hierarchical church tribunal rather than look for an implied
trust. Later, the Court recognized majority rule in congregational
churches and indicated that it would review the actions of the
church to determine whether the church had complied with its own
procedures. 5 Since the Watson decision was a diversity case and the
first amendment was not applied to the states until much later," the
state courts continued to follow the implied trust concept until 1969.
In that year the Court reversed a Georgia Supreme Court decision
allowing two Presbyterian churches to withdraw from that denom-
ination with their property because the denomination was found by
the state court to have departed from its original tenets and doc-
trines. 7 The Court observed that the
departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied
trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters
at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of parti-
cular church doctrines and the importance of those doc-
trines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment for-
bids civil courts from playing such a role . . [Tihe
departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust
theory can play no role in any future judicial
proceedings.
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9130 (West 1977).
64. 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 679 (1871). See text accompanying note 33 supra.
65. Boudin v. Alexander, 15 U.S. (1 Wall.) 131 (1827). See also Brundage v.
Deardor, 55 F. 839 (N.D. Ohio 1893).
66. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940).
67. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), rev'g, Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Hts. Presbyterian
Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
68. 393 U.S. at 450 (emphasis added).
1981]
Morgan: The Significance of Church Organizational Structure in Litigation
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
158 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol.16
The court observed, however, that "there are neutral principles of
law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied
.... States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure
relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil
courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions." 9 In 1979, the Supreme
Court decided Jones v. Wolf." The Supreme Court of Georgia had
affirmed a trial court decision in favor of the majority of a divided
Presbyterian congregation where the trial court applied the neutral
principles of law. This concept had been outlined 71 by the Georgia
Supreme Court in response to the United States Supreme Court's
reversal of Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church.7 2 The court award-
ed the property to the majority of the local congregation because
the deeds were to that congregation and a review of the local
church charter, state statutes, and general church constitution
revealed no language of trust in favor of the general church. The
Supreme Court remanded because the state courts had not express-
ed their basis for determining that the majority represented the
local church. The Court indicated that the state might use a rebut-
table presumption that the church follows a rule of majority repre-
sentation, or it might determine the faction properly representing
the local church by looking to the polity of the general church. In
that instance, however, the court would be constitutionally required
to give deference to the determination of the appropriate church
tribunal.
The important message from this case is that churches can ex-
pect their charters, articles of incorporation, constitutions, bylaws,
and similar organizational documents to be reviewed in a search for
express language of trust and "through appropriate reversionary
clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is
to happen to church property in the event of a particular contin-
gency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the
event of a schism or doctrinal controversy."73 The same rule may
very likely be applied to any conflict where church corporate form is
relevant. This places a great deal of responsibility, as well as
69. Id. at 449.
70. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
71. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d
658 (1969).
72. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
73. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603-04. In fact the court indicates an "obligation
of 'states, religious organizations, and individuals to structure relationships involving
church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical
questions.' " (citation omitted).
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opportunity, in the hands of church leaders and attorneys to draft
documents that clearly indicate the allocation of church authority
for the determination of organizational purpose, the control of
church assets, and the resolution of church conflicts.
Although the Court approved the neutral principles of law ap-
proach as a constitutionally valid method of resolving church litiga-
tion, it also pointed out that "the First Amendment does not dictate
that a state must follow a particular method of resolving church
property disputes. Indeed, 'a state may adopt any one of various ap-
proaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves
no consideration of doctrinal matters.' " An organization should ex-
pressly indicate who will determine the use of its assets, for whose
benefit they are held, and who is to resolve any differences over the
use of assets or conduct of any other business.
The widespread use of the corporate form has given some
courts an apparent justification for greater involvement in religious
affairs. In a dispute over the authority of a pastor to call a special
church business meeting, the Washington Supreme Court observed
that the president of a corporation has no power to call a meeting
unless the bylaws or a resolution of the board of directors make it
his duty to do so." "While the cited cases pertain to private busi-
ness corporations, we see no reason why the rule there announced is
not equally applicable to religious corporations."7 In a dispute over
the right of a church-operated hospital to approve a pension plan for
the members of a religious order that had provided services to the
hospital, the court dismissed a reference to canon law by stating,
"plaintiffs have sought the benefits of and conformed to the general
requirements of civil law; they cannot now decline to be ruled by
the principles which [the hospital] has itself invited."" In a dispute
between a Baptist pastor and members of his congregation over the
conduct of a church business meeting, a Kentucky court ruled, "the
right of action by or against religious corporations and the proce-
dure in such actions are governed by the rules governing actions by
or against corporations generally."78 The court further observed,
"such a corporation is civil in nature and is an entity distinguishable
74. Id. at 602 (citation omitted)(emphasis added).
75. State Bank of Wilbur v. Wilbur Mission Church, 44 Wash. 2d 80, 265 P.2d
821 (1954).
76. Id. at -, 265 P.2d at 827.
77. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36
(1977).
78. Willis v. Davis, 323 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Ky. 1959).
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from an ecclesiastical society or association."79 It appears that courts
generally will recognize that a corporation is in some degree distinct
from the ecclesiastical or spiritual body of the church, s" and greater
regulation may be attempted because a state-created entity appears
more secular in nature and the state feels entitled to control the en-
tity it has created.
Although the courts insistence on treating corporations as civil
entities may not be entirely misplaced, a church might appropriately
consider whether it is better not to incorporate at all but to conduct
its business as an unincorporated association. At common law an un-
incorporated association had no legal identity and could not hold
title to property."s Today many states provide some degree of legal
recognition for unincorporated associations by statute" and the
courts have moved toward recognizing unincorporated associations
as separate legal entities and limiting the liability of members of
associations for acts that they did not personally authorize or per-
form. 3 Indeed, for a church with a hierarchical structure where
property is dedicated to the purposes of the general church, it may
be appropriate to question whether any purpose is served by incor-
porating local congregations. Some denominations of hierarchical
structure do not incorporate their local congregations and no cases
have been found where this has created difficulty.
CONCLUSION
Historically there has been a gradual change in the alternatives
available to churches and religious organizations in developing their
organizational structure. Today it is clear that courts will not delve
into religious beliefs and church ecclesiastical matters84 and will not
impose an implied trust on church assets. Since the Supreme Court
has specifically indicated that states may follow various alternative
methods of resolving church property disputes, the law will vary
from state to state. The principles applied in those cases can also be
expected to apply in may other cases where organizational structure
79. Id. at 848.
80. See Burnett v. Banks, 130 Cal. App. 2d 631, 279 P.2d 579 (1955).
81. See, e.g., Grand Grove of United Ancient Order of Druids v. Garibaldi
Grove No. 71, 130 Cal. 116, 62 P. 486 (1900).
82. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 20000 et seq. (West 1977).
83. See Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1979); Orser
v. George, 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967).
84. Courts will not delve into religious beliefs except to consider the need to
accommodate a religious observance. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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is significant. Courts can also be expected to apply the same prin-
ciples to religious organizations that are applied to other organiza-
tions. Religious corporations will often be considered separate from
the ecclesiastical body of the church and will be dealt with according
to the rules applying to nonprofit corporations generally. Congrega-
tional churches will be dealt with on the basis that they are govern-
ed by a majority rule subject to compliance with their own properly
adopted rules and procedures. With regard to hierarchical churches,
courts may either rely on the decisions made by hierarchical au-
thority or they may conduct an objective review of the organi-
zational structure to determine the rights, responsibilities, or
authority involved. These concepts follow the treatment the courts
have accorded to secular organizations. Thus, "the hierarchical
church is less often vulnerable to judicial instrusion by virtue of the
fact that it has its own general law, procedure, and organs for the
authoritative resolution of internal disputes. '8 5 While churches are
not likely to change their denominational structure from congrega-
tional to hierarchical in order to escape judicial intrusion, the door
has been opened wide for churches to exercise resourcefulness in
structuring themselves to minimize judicial intrusion in their organi-
zational affairs and to substantially improve the prospects that the
government will relate to the organization on the same terms in
which the church perceives itself.
Initially churches should review state law applicable to
religious organizations and ask for statutes that are clear and con-
cise, giving functional guidelines for formation and operation of
religious organizations with the maximum latitude for structuring
organizations in conformity with the polity of the church, including
the appropriate use of unincorporated associations and both mem-
bership and trustee corporations, with a minimum of state involve-
ment. Second, church organizational structure should be reviewed to
determine that it correctly reflects church polity and objectives. If
corporations are formed there should be a review of the role they
will fill in the church structure, recognizing that their operation may
be the subject of increased judicial review. Organizational doc-
uments should demonstrate a clear, express, functional description
of the intended sources of authority and the intended purpose with
a clear indication of whether there is authority to deviate from the
express purpose. There should be a clear guideline in organization
bylaws of the procedure by which decisions are to be made and a
specific avenue of appeal where there is any internal disagreement.
85. Brady v. Reiner, 157 W.Va. 10, 198 S.E.2d 812, 827 (1973).
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Especially in the case of congregational churches, mandatory media-
tion and possibly even binding arbitration might be considered as an
expressly mandated means for resolving any internal disagreements.
There should be an express statement of whose benefit assets are
held for and an express procedure"6 for resolving disagreements
over the use of assets, over the exercise of authority, over proce-
dure of organizational business and appeals, and over membership in
the organization.
The ground rules for judicial intervention in religious
disputes are now being nationalized and the application of
these rules will be subject to supervision by the Supreme
Court. Churches of both types of polities now may assert
a federal constitutional liberty to define and develop their
doctrines and to determine their affiliations with other
church bodies, free from the hazards of litigation in the
civil courts over the departure from doctrine issue ...
[Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church] elevates a religious
body's organic law-charter, constitution, and bylaws-to
a new level of importance. Values served by the departure
from doctrine standard, in terms of institutional stability
and the expectations of donors, can be achieved by formu-
lations explicitly set forth in the organization's basic docu-
ments. Similarly, the church organization, whatever its
polity, is in the best position to maintain its autonomy as
against the risk of judicial intervention by spelling out in
its organic law the focus of authority, the procedure to be
followed, and the limitations to be observed. 7
86. This does not necessarily mean a detailed or complex procedure. The
courts will review church decisions for procedural due process and a church should
avoid creating an exacting procedure that invites technical error.
87. Church Autonomy, supra note 36, at 378.
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